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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: A RECOMMENDATION FOR
A PROOF OF FAULT SYSTEM WITHOUT
A LIMITATION ON LIABILITY
By PAUL B. LARSENt
I. INTRODUCTION
THE LEGAL problem which the world faces in regard to air traffic
control services can be described this way: commerce must not be
unreasonably restricted. Swift aerial intercourse between states is favored
by community policy, but, as has been true for all forms of traffic, there
must be regulation of flight to make it safe. Moreover, liability must be
borne by the air traffic control agency for its conduct of air traffic. That
liability is of growing concern, yet remains badly defined and is the sub-
ject of the present discussion.
First we will gain perspective on the issue by construing a frame of
reference, that is, by mentioning certain recent technical and legal develop-
ments and defining important terms.
II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND LEGAL SITUATION
Fed by astonishing technical developments, air traffic has raced far ahead
of the controls which our legal system exercises. We have recognized the
dangers without having had time to enact adequate, encompassing legisla-
tion. Air traffic control (hereinafter ATC) is today in the hands of
separate States, or their regional groupings, with guidelines set forth in
the Annexes to the Chicago Convention.'
During 1964, airport control towers in the United States handled
32,857,745 aircraft operations, and the number is rapidly increasing.
Other countries also report great air traffic burdens. Western Germany
handled 750,000 aircraft operations in 1963 in spite of a much smaller
airspace.' Add to this a picture of aircraft becoming larger and faster,
with a prospect of supersonic carriage, and the consequence must be our
deep concern with the probability of aircraft collision.
t A.B., Wilmington (Ohio) College; LL.B., University of Cincinnati; LL.M. in International
Law, New York University; LL.M. in Air and Space Law, McGill University; presently engaged
in space law research at Yale University and is a candidate for the J.S.D. degree.
aConvention on International Civil Aviation, 7 Dec. 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591
(effective 4 April 1947) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention]. Annex 2 (Rules of the Air);
Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services); Annex 14 (Aerodromes). Article 12 of the Convention delegates
air traffic control over the high seas to ICAO so that the Annexes are directly applicable here.
'6 FAA ANN. REP. 25 (1964).
'Meyer, Introductory Remarks to the 3 May 1965 Meeting of the Rechtsausschuss der Wissen-
schaftlichen Gesellschaft fiir Luft- und Raumfahrt (unpublished to date).
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Bo Lundberg presents an almost terrifying picture of the future.' On
the premise that air transport will continue its present rate of increase,
and supposing that the present fatality rate is maintained, he predicts
that scheduled air carriers will cause the deaths of 25,000 persons annually
in the year 2010; and, if general aviation and charter flights are added,
that figure will rise to 60,000 fatalities. If people were to read about air-
craft-caused fatalities every day, transport by air would become seriously
affected by public opinion.
All the participants in transport by air-the aircraft commander repre-
senting the pole of potential claimants, the air traffic controller representing
the pole of potential defendants-want to improve the safety situation
in order to reduce economic losses. Two strategies are involved: (1) vast
improvement of air traffic control in order to reduce economic losses, and
(2) legal protection of investment in improved technology.
The Federal Aviation Agency, encouraged by earlier studies,' but in
direct response to the "Project Beacon" report of 1961,' has now estab-
lished area positive control service above 24,000 feet altitude. Area positive
control extends substantially beyond the three mile limit over the high
seas, and it is hoped that the air floor can soon be lowered from 24,000
feet to 18,000 feet.7
Computer-run ATC is central to the FAA's area positive control system.
In present use is a sixty-four code, ten channel beacon system. Correspond-
ing to this method of ground radar, aircraft are equipped with a trans-
ponder which can be activated by the ground control and automatically
gives position reports. If radio contact is lost, the transponder can show
the emergency on the controller's radar scope. It is, in fact, such an intri-
cate communication system that the transponder not only identifies the
plane, but can automatically read the altimeter and report the plane's
changing altitude to the ground radar.'
Only Instrument Flight Rules9 are permitted in area positive control.
In this zone, the pilot may not change from IFR to Visual Flight Rules
(VFR). He may not operate his plane contrary to ATC instructions while
in area positive control, or in any other area which is subject to ATC.
The pilot is forbidden to deviate from his ATC clearance unless an
emergency exists."0
Fifty per cent of all passenger miles in the United States will soon be
flown in airspace above 18,000 feet, where area positive control will exist.
' Lundberg, Speed and Safety in Civil Aviation, 95 FLYGTEKNISKA FORSOKSANSTALTEN 15-16
(1963-1964).
'Airport and Its Neighbors, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S AIRPORT COMMISSION [The Doolittle
Report] (1952).
'FAA, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, PROJECT BEACON (1961).
Klass, Air Traffic Control Blueprint-Part 1: System Moderization Starts to Pay Off, Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 20 Jan. 1964, pp. 52, 59.
" Ibid. Time, 23 April 1965, p. 77 is the first report to come to this writer's attention that
the FAA goal described in its 1964 annual report, supra note 2, at 38-39, was achieved.
' Instrument Flight Rules are hereinafter referred to as IFR, while the opposite Visual Flight
Rules will be referred to as VFR.
*°FAA Reg. Part 91, § 91.75, 14 C.F.R. Part 91.75 (1963).
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FAA is now planning an advanced form of ATC which will be able to
automatically track 4,096 transponder-equipped aircraft simultaneously."
The size of the investment in air traffic control may best be illustrated by
the FAA's budget increase from $131 million in 1955 to $717 million in
1965.12
A major shift in responsibility from the aircraft commander to the
ground controller is the result of this tremendous investment in tech-
nology. As the air traffic controller assumes greater legal responsibility,
the aircraft commander is relieved of some of his. A multitude of varying
laws, reflecting almost every legal system in the world, regulates ATC
liability to claimants damaged in international air transport. Regional
ATC organizations have been formed in Europe, Africa, and Central
America,13 and have alleviated in a local way, but not solved, the problems
of foreign litigants. Only a convention on ATC liability would help them
overcome the obstacles of sovereign immunity attached to claims against
government-operated ATC. A convention would establish a definite legal
uniformity, provide certainty of recovery, promote safer air traffic con-
trol,14 and fill a vacuum in private international air law. This is so because,
although the Warsaw and Rome Conventions"s regulate claims against the
aircraft carrier or operator, claims against ATC are not regulated by
convention.
In 1964, the newly formed ICAO Subcommittee on the Liability of
Air Traffic Control Agencies (hereafter called the Subcommittee) met
for the first time. The Subcommittee has met twice, and it was authorized
by the ICAO Legal Committee meeting in the autumn of 1964 to con-
tinue its work. One of the most important ways through which, it sug-
gested, regulation could be accomplished, was a special convention on
ATC liability."
11 Klass, supra note 7, at 53; Klass, Air Traffic Control Blueprint-Part 3: Modernization Plan
Faces Cost Obstacles, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 Feb. 1964, p. 87, 94.
116 FAA ANN. REP. 116 (1964).
13 "Eurocontrol," International Convention Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air
Navigation, 13 Dec. 1960. "ASECNA," Convention Relative i la Crtation d'une Agence Chargfe de
G~rer les Installations et Services Destinis i Assurer la Stcurit6 de la Navigation A&ienne en Afrique
et i Madagascar, 12 Dec. 1959. "COCESNA," Convention Portant Criation d'une Soci&t6 des Serv-
ices de Navigation Aerienne Pour I'Amerique Centrale, 24 Feb. 1960. Reprinted in MATTE, TRAITE
DE DROIT AERIEN-AERONAUTIQUE 823, 783, 803 (2d ed. 1964).
14 PROJECT BEACON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 99, emphasizes that high quality ATC needs
constant quality testing and inspection.
" Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention), 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1929); amended by the Protocol
to Amend the Warsaw Convention (The Hague Protocol), 28 Sept. 1955, 1955 U.S. & Can. Av.
521; enlarged by the Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention (Guadalajara Con-
vention), 18 Sept. 1961, 1963 U.S. Av. 313, reprinted in 28 J. AIR L. & COM. 45 (1961-62).
Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (Rome Con-
vention), 7 Oct. 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181 (1958), reprinted in 19 J. AIR L. & CoM. 447 (1952).
"o First Report of the ICAO Legal Committee's Subcommittee on the Liability of Air Traffic
Control Agencies, ICAO LC/SC/LATC No. 19, at 16 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LATC No. 19].
Other ways of regulating ATC liability are: (1) Incorporation of ATC liability into a con-
solidated convention which would also regulate liability for damage caused by foreign aircraft to
third parties on the surface, and aerial collisions. (2) Combination of ATC liability with the pro-
posed Convention on Aerial Collisions. (3) Amendment of other private air law conventions to
include ATC liability. (4) Regulation of ATC liability within a convention on the international
responsibility of states for injuries to aliens under the auspices of the United Nations. For a dis-
cussion of these alternatives see Larsen, The Regulation of Air Traffic Control Liability by Inter-
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III. THE CONVENTION'S DEFINITION OF ATC
The legal protection of ATC agencies lies best with the court which
will include in its consideration of negligence the nature of the services
offered, the nature of the terrain, the amount of reliance by the pilot,
whether he reasonably should have relied, and whether such defenses as
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk should be allowed.
Central to a proof of fault liability system, which the author favors, is
a wide definition of responsible agents, giving the plaintiff a spectrum of
possibilities upon which to base his difficult court procedure. The follow-
ing definition should be noted:
(1) ATC Proper. Annex 11 of the Chicago Convention" defines ATC
as area and approach control for IFR flying, and airport control service
for all flights. This is a technical definition for the purpose of directing
air traffic, not for the allocation of legal responsibility, so we are free to
include within it any other appropriate air traffic services.
(2) Flight Information is a service usually available in controlled air-
space to give weather information and related statistics when requested
by pilots.1 "
(3) Air Trafic Advisory Service provides more reliable information
about collision danger than is given by Flight Information Service. It is
temporary, pending the establishment of ATC Proper.19
(4) Alerting Service is offered by ATC Proper and by Flight Informa-
tion Centers in case of an emergency, to call the alert and to collect and
disseminate information."
(5) Operation and Maintenance of Air Navigation Facilities. Air navi-
gation aids enable the pilot to fly without reference to landmarks below.
There is a close relationship between ATC Proper and navigation aids
which are, in fact, now being combined in the United States to simplify
pilot tasks.'
(6) The Airport Facilities category involves dangerous conditions which
may interfere with the orderly flow of traffic.
(7) Meteorological Services are often supplied by separate weather
bureaus, and then transmitted by ATC Proper or Flight! Information
Service to the pilot. Only liability for meteorological information generated
by the transmitter himself, or his faulty transmission of correct weather
information, is our concern.
(8) Search and Rescue Services" performed by air traffic control agen-
cies, rather than by third parties, concern us here.
A legal definition of ATC should include all these services so as to make
national Convention, August 1965 (unpublished thesis in McGill University Institute of Air and
Space Law Library). The thesis was supported through the generosity of the v. Humbolt Stiftung
at the University of Cologne, Germany.
" Chicago Convention, Annex 11, para. 2.3.
2s Chicago Convention, Annex 11, para. 2.6.
19ICAO Doc. 4444-RAC/501/1, Part VII, para. 1.2.1 (1960).
" Chicago Convention, Annex 11, paras. 5.1.2-3.
1 FAA, DESIGN FOR THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE UTILIZATION SYSTEM 57-61 (1961). FAA, AIR
TRAFFIC SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 24 (1963).
22 Chicago Convention, Annex 12.
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the proof of fault system protect investments as widely as possible. The
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that a legal duty of care toward him
was breached. The farther away one moves from ATC Proper, the harder
it is to prove the existence of a duty of care in the performance of services.
IV. CHOICE OF LIABILITY SYSTEMS
Traffic control on the roads and railroads does not provide sufficiently
useful analogies for a regulation of ATC liability, because of the differ-
ences in speed, modes of regulation, and economic values involved. Sea
traffic provides some interesting comparison between the aircraft com-
mander and the ship captain, but since our focus is on ATC, which does
not well correspond to speeds and traffic control methods at sea, it is more
useful to look to other private air law conventions in a search for legal
regulation of ATC liability. Such comparisons will be made as they cor-
respond to each part of our discussion.
In the Warsaw Convention, the air carriers, passengers, and shippers
are all participants in a joint venture and should all assume some of the
economic burdens connected with the risk involved. Therefore presumed
liability of the air carrier exists.' With respect to the Rome Convention,
the third party on the ground has no interest in the flight. Therefore, he
should not carry any part of the risk. This is the reason for the absolute
liability of the carrier in that convention.'
The Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions has a mixed system of fault
liability. The liability of the other operator is determined through the
claimant's (operator's) proof of fault, but a presumption of fault exists
in regard to collision damage suffered by passengers and shippers." The
draftsmen of this convention believed that a single system of liability
would not be desirable.
How can the ATC liability situation be compared to the subject matters
of the other private air law conventions? No joint venture similar to
that described in the Warsaw Convention exists between the ATC agency
and any of its potential victims. Furthermore, the ATC agency has no
contract to share risk with any of those potential victims.2" The third per-
son on the surface is perhaps in a special position, in that he has absolutely
no interest in the flight. In general, however, we will look for a system
which regulates the relationship between independents.
A. Approach I: Search For A System Stronger Than Proof Of Fault
One can begin a summary of arguments concerning a proof of fault
'3 Warsaw Convention, Chap. III. DRION, LIMITATION ON LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
LAW 12 (1954).
"
4 Rome Convention, Chapter I. DRION, OP. cit. supra note 23, at 12.
2' Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, ICAO Doc. 8444 LC/151, Arts. 4, 5 (1964). For the
text of the Convention and commentary relating to the Convention see Mankiewicz, The ICAO
Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 375 (1964)
" A rare exception is the contractual relationship between pilot and ATC found in the United
Kingdom under its Standard Conditions under which Aircraft may Land, be Parked, Housed or
Otherwise Dealt with on Airdromes under the Control of the Minister of Aviation, FAL 24 and
25, U.K. "Air Pilot."
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system from the standpoint that it should be accepted, unless it can be
shown that absolute liability or presumed liability better suits the subject
matter. From the now obsolete Sweeney-Orr debate" we can list Sweeney's
points (1) that evidence in aviation cases is difficult to obtain, (2) that
there is a need for uniformity, (3) that unlimited liability could create a
catastrophe hazard to aviation, (4) that insurance is necessary, and (5)
that assured payments are better than potentially complete but difficult
to obtain ones. Orr, who describes himself as having been engaged in
"directing more litigation involving aviation liability than any other man
certainly in this hemisphere,"" has in this writer's opinion substantially
countered that position by presenting the following arguments: (1) evi-
dence of negligence in aviation is not unusually difficult to obtain, (2)
there is no need for regulation of liability for the sake of uniformity alone,
(3) United States practice has indicated that a lack of a limit has not
deterred aviation, (4) there is no tendency in aviation of failure to pay
claims because they are too high, and (5) thus there is no need for an
absolute but limited liability system like that found in the United States
workmen's compensation system.
At this point we may add Ehrenzweig's significant arguments against
a proof of fault system for traffic victims. In general, his opinions concur
with Sweeney's, but he develops them further in two areas-morality and
economy. The moral point is that a proof of fault system does not effec-
tively fix guilt. When one contends with juries and witnesses, it is most
difficult to discover "truth." 9 Therefore, one should lift the problem out
of a moral frame-of-reference. Absolute liability has the disadvantage of
favoring the victim, but if one concedes that the victim should be favored
over the tortfeasor, then it follows that the tortfeasor's "innocence" or
"guilt" is less important than reparation to the victim. Ehrenzweig's eco-
nomic arguments are that proof of fault causes cases to be brought into
courts instead of being settled outside, thus clogging the court system and
causing great delay in recovery and often forcing the victim to settle too
easily for too little."0
One is forced to note, after relating these arguments to ATC, that the
fixing of guilt is not the justification of the proof of fault system, partic-
ularly when governments or large corporations, rather than individuals,
are involved. Guilt pales beside fact-it is the procedure which brings
valuable evidence concerning the negligence, that justifies the proof of
fault system. Moreover, in the United States at least, the claimant would
27 Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential? (pts. 1 & 2), 19 J. AIR L. &
COM. 166, 317 (1952). Professor Sweeney edited the Journal of Air Law and Commerce from
1947 through 1957; he prepared Report to the Civil Aeronautics Board of a Study of the Proposed
Aviation Liability Legislation, which first appeared in 1941 (typed) and forms the basis of his
views on liability systems.
Orr, Fault as the Basis of Liability, 21 J. AIR L. & CoM. 399 (1954). As Director of Claims,
United States Aircraft Insurance Group, Orr expressed opinions often diametrically opposite to
those of Sweeney. In view of his capacity, he must be considered as expressing the interests of
aviation insurers.
28 Orr, Is Aviation Ultra Hazardous? 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 48 (1954).
" EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 4-6 (1954).
" Id. at 5.
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face not a jury, but a judge, in an ATC case against the government.
Although there may be delay in the victim recovering within a court, one
cannot say that such injustice outweighs that suffered when a straight
settlement is made which does not take into any great account evidentiary
facts and is not flexible enough to adjust the award to the injury. Circum-
venting the courts seems only to substitute difficulties, not to mend them.
It is in the area of unprovable cases that Finn Hjalsted's argument
against proof of fault is the strongest. He believes that most aviation cases
fall in the "grey area" where it is difficult to prove negligence. A proof
of fault system then throws the burden on the claimant, leaving him with
no possibility of recompense."' He believes, with Calkins," that the carrier
(in this case the ATC agency), not the individual, should bear the risk
from a public policy point of view.
When the foregoing theory is related to ATC negligence, one cannot
help but see an ATC convention working in concert with other private
air law conventions. It does not make up deficits which fall on the fringe
of the ATC subject matter, but covers its central problems well, as should
other conventions cover theirs. Thus, if the controller is clearly at fault,
his negligence will not be difficult to prove. If his fault is not clear, the
presumed and absolute liability systems of the other air law conventions
will absorb the "grey" cases.
B. Approach II: Making The Proof Of Fault System Show Its Strength
If we begin from the standpoint that another system must exist unless
proof of fault can show its worth, we have the following arguments, con-
sidered from points of view of the States, claimants, defendants, and the
subjects of other private air law conventions.
In the first place, reference to the ICAO questionnaire in relation to
liability of ATC agencies shows one that proof of fault system for ATC
liability is what states and regional organizations now have." It would re-
quire the least amount of adjustment on their part.
More basically, we must consider the system as would those who must
use it. For governments-the potential defendants-the proof of fault
system provides maximum protection. It allows the greatest number of
defenses:' (1) that no causal relationship between the ATC agency's act
or omission and the injury existed, (2) contributory negligence by the
plaintiff, (3) force majeure, (4) waiver of liability by the plaintiff, and
(5) plaintiff's assumption of the risk. Moreover, fewer claims will be
initiated, because the difficulty of proving fault will contrast in the claim-
ant's mind with the relative ease of recovery under the Warsaw, Rome,
" Hjalstead, Air Carrier's Liability in Cases of Unknown Cause of Damage, 27 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 1, 14 (1960).
"Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw, and The Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. & CoM. 253, 256
(1956).
' Answers to the ICAO Questionnaire in Relation to Liability of ATC Agencies, ICAO
LC/SC/LATC Nos. 1-15, 17 [hereinafter cited as ICAO Questionnaire]; LC/Working Draft No.
701, Addenda Nos. 1-15 (1963-1964).
'4Larsen, The Regulation of Air Traic Control by International Convention, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 24.
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or Draft Aerial Collisions Conventions. Fewer recourse actions by the ATC
agency against the air carrier will be initiated because, similarly, the rela-
tively difficult procedure will discourage claimants from suing the ATC
agency in order to recover higher amounts indirectly.5 Since governments
are three times involved as ICAO delegates, as signers of the convention,
and as the very subject matter, we cannot discount the argument that
governments will insist on a proof of fault system as the one which pro-
vides maximum protection.
How does the system look to the claimant? He will want the wide
definition of ATC services which the proof of fault system allows the
drafters to include, because he will want to sue for as many kinds of
damages as possible. Beyond that, it can be supposed that since damages
in aviation cases are likely to be severe, the claimant will want to be made
"whole," and he will not want a token payment. If that claimant pro-
duces good evidence that the ATC agency was at fault, he can recover
to his satisfaction. He has an entire national court system within which to
show his case to best advantage. If he does not have conclusive evidence
of ATC negligence, he retains a reasonable chance of recovering an assured
limited amount from the air carrier under the other private air law con-
ventions. The claimant then gains the advantage of a full recovery, while
not losing the opportunity to recover from the air carrier under easier
procedure.
How would the aircraft operator or carrier, who is the potential de-
fendant under other private air law conventions, regard an ATC liability
convention based on proof of fault? Undoubtedly most cases would be
directed against the air carrier, since claimants who do not have specific
evidence of ATC negligence will try to fit their cases under the Warsaw,
Rome, or Draft Aerial Collisions Conventions. Another side to that argu-
ment, however, is that a proof of fault system will discourage recourse
actions, thus encouraging claims to be settled in one action. If fewer
claims are initiated and contested, less money will be spent on fringe bene-
fits such as legal fees.
The previous ICAO study of liability systems has been in connection
with the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions. In that study, we find
that proof of fault exists as a basic rule." The exception-passengers and
shippers of goods who recover from the negligent airline on a presumed
fault system-seems to arise for the sake of uniformity; it "gives pas-
sengers and consignors the same benefit of presumed liability of the opera-
tor of the other aircraft-with whom they would normally have no
contractual relationship-as they would have with respect to their own
operator if he were a carrier under a Warsaw contract.""
If the exception in the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions exists
merely for the sake of uniformity with the Warsaw Convention, what
"5 See VI C infra.
3 ICAO Doc. 8444 LC/151, supra note 25, at 15 ("Principles of Liability"); ICAO
LC/SC/Aerial Collisions No. 72, at 8 (1962).
37 ICAO LC/SC/Aerial Collisions No. 72, supra note 36, at 8-9.
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compelling reasons are there for a system other than proof of fault in
the Warsaw and Rome Conventions? Since the parties covered by the
Warsaw Convention are all participants in a "joint venture," the theory
is that they should all assume some of the risk, proportioned so that the
greatest burden rests on the air carrier, and the claimants are slightly
favored. In the Rome Convention, the third person on the ground has no
interest in the flight; therefore, he should assume no risk at all. Absolute
liability completely weights the chances in favor of the claimant.
In an ATC liability convention, there would be no contractual agree-
ment to share risks between the ATC agency on the one hand, and the
air carrier, passengers, and shippers on the other. First, the passengers and
shippers have a contract, not with the ATC agency but with the air carrier.
Second, although the aircraft operator and air traffic controller are often
in direct contact, they are not contractual members of a joint venture,
but simply two independents mutually interested in the safe completion
of a flight. For the sake of uniformity with the Warsaw Convention, the
Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions artificially creates a bond in the
form of presumed liability between the negligent aircraft operator and
the passenger and shippers of the other aircraft. Since no other conventions
exist on the subject of ATC, exceptions for uniformity do not come into
question.
The only participant for whom an exception might be justified is the
third person on the surface. He is truly innocent in that he has no interest
in the flight at all. It is reasonable to believe, however, that the third
person on the surface will recover under the Rome Convention, unless he
desires higher compensation. If he has certain evidence of ATC negligence,
he will have little difficulty in recovering under a proof of fault system.
Therefore, the third person on the surface does not seem to be that com-
pelling a reason for an exception.
The writer favors the proof of fault system, and in addition suggests
that an adoption of the definition of "fault" found in Article 3 of the
Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States
for Injuries to Aliens would be best in the interest of uniformity:
An act or omission attributable to a defendant is a "fault" within the
meaning of this convention, (a) if, without sufficient justification, it is
intended to cause or to facilitate the causing of an injury; (b) if, without
justification, it creates an unreasonable risk of injury through a failure to
exercise due care."5
Now we move forward to the complicated problem of a limitation on
liability.
V. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY PROBLEMS
A. Policy Considerations.
In this review of the arguments for a limitation on liability, the second-
38HARVARD DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INJURIES TO ALIENS, Art. 3 (1961), reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 548 (1961).
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ary problem will be whether or not that limit in question will be one
monetary limitation uniform for all the private air law conventions. Those
who champion a limit on liability have compelling supporting arguments.
Those who deny the value of a limit cannot refute those arguments but
offer their own equally interesting points of view. That is the curious
aspect of the limitation debate. A dilemma exists, and it must be solved,
but successful refutation of all the arguments on either side is impossible.
Whatever choice is made is bound to be uncomfortable.
Let us look in on the debate to illustrate our point. The pro-limitation
group argues that States now expect limits on liability in private air law
conventions, and many will rebel if it is not included. Economically im-
poverished countries cannot pay $900,0003' for the loss of a single life-
$8,300 (the present Warsaw Convention limit) would probably be the
most they could afford. If the convention included such a limit, every
claimant could hope to recover that amount. Lacking that limit, the
foreign claimant would have to contend with such a variety of court
standards that his claim might be considered hopeless from the beginning.
For example, if the claimant is from a State with an exceptionally high
standard of living, and he must press his suit in an economically im-
poverished State, he cannot expect to be fully recompensed for his loss.
He cannot hope that the judge will appreciate his need for what would
there seem unreasonable compensation, and the claimant might find his
proof of fault suit so difficult that the final award would barely cover
court costs. On the other hand, if there is a limit, that same claimant
would undoubtedly receive it with much less difficulty, simply because it
was established, it was accepted. The fact that States will tend to pay the
limit seems to be substantiated by Warsaw cases. The claimant receives a
less, but certain, amount. Another forceful argument is that uniformity
is important to prevent unjust recourse actions, where the ATC agency
might be sued for enormous amounts but might be able to recover only
the Warsaw limit in a recourse action against the airline.
Convinced that these arguments have value, we turn to the other side
to hear the following points of view: the government ATC agency does
not need the economic protection of a limit when it has a high degree of
protection from its national court system and the proof of fault pro-
cedure. Unless the ATC agency has been very obviously negligent, the
claimant will try to fit his suit under the Warsaw or Rome Conventions,
where the procedure will not be so difficult and the award will be more
certain. Clear-cut cases of ATC negligence will be rare, and in the large
number of cases in the "grey" area, where the blame is uncertain, the
ATC agency is favored. The government, of course, has attorneys whose
specialty is air law, where the average person may have an attorney whose
first acquaintance with air law comes in dealing with the claimant's case.
"Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 Sup, Ct. 559 (1966). The district court's de-
cision but not its estimated value of human life was reversed by the Second Circuit. The district
court opinion was discussed in 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 394 (1964).
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In the United States there is no jury trial for claimants suing the Govern-
ment, and instead of the sympathy of fellow citizens, the claimant must
face a knowledgeable and experienced judge.
More persuasively, there is intense difficulty in agreeing on limits. The
United States, which handles by far the most air traffic, would not join
a convention with limited liability unless the limits were very high. Cer-
tainly, in working this matter out, we should begin from the premise that
the need for a limit must be clearly established before we accept it. The
two strongest arguments are economic considerations and the need for
uniformity. The problems of sovereign immunity and security follow. We
will investigate each of these.
B. Economic Considerations
In weighing the economic advantages and disadvantages of a limitation
on liability for the ATC convention, a conflict between ideal and prag-
matic points of view can be noted. When a government undertakes to
establish air transportation, including the obligatory aid of ATC, it should
certainly be prepared to pay for the consequences of its negligence. Theo-
retically, one should not have to ask whether a State can afford unlimited
liability, but should be able to assume its readiness to pay for its faults
and make the injured party "whole" again. Actually, States may estab-
lish air transportation for such unrelated reasons as prestige, and thus incur
the obligation to provide ATC, while being unable to pay for the full
consequences of their negligence.
If we are pragmatic, we admit a flaw in our legal philosophy and admit
the inability of court systems to make a claimant "whole" and, perhaps,
encourage that inability by establishing a limit on government liability.
If, on the contrary, we insist that the claimant has the right to justly re-
cover damages if he can prove the ATC agency's negligence, do we flout
reality?
The actual division is not so harsh. The law can be allowed to establish
a standard, which, in this case, is that governments desiring the benefits
of air transportation must be able to pay for damages of their ensuing
negligence, while at the same time giving those governments such protec-
tion, through a proof of fault system, that the chances of their being sued
repeatedly would be so greatly reduced that their resources would be
sufficient to pay awards on those few successful claims.
Government protection, which is a major object of a proof of fault
system for an ATC convention, is insured to such an extent that we can
discount the argument that impoverished States could not pay awards to
claimants from wealthy States. Instead, it must be asked how useful a
convention would be without the inclusion of the United States, which
would almost certainly not join a convention with a limit acceptable to
poorer countries, particularly when so much of the world's air traffic is
over the North Atlantic and deals with United States ATC. To prove
that point, it need only be noted that the United States has not joined the
unsuccessful Rome Convention, much because of the Convention's low
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limits, and has announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Convention
for the same reason.-°
If a limit were established, could States not supplement it with insur-
ance, as Sand persuasively proposes?4' Indeed, that suggestion found the
support of the United States Administration which introduced a bill into
Congress to that effect, but the bill was opposed by the aircraft operators,
who after all would be forced to contend with a variety of limits if the
practice spread to foreign states. According to the aircraft operators, a
convention is supposed to smooth the difficulties of international flight,
not to create new obstacles.
Would a limit encourage States to provide more air traffic control? In
the ICAO Subcommittee it was argued that States' major concern in pro-
viding ATC was safety rather than liability,"2 and it is hoped that this is
indeed true. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the high cost of air
traffic services is a curb on expansion. It is significant that the Federal
Aviation Agency's budget has risen tremendously in the last decade, and
that it is becoming increasingly difficult to persuade legislatures to grant
more money for ATC services. Are not the impoverished States the very
ones which should be encouraged to produce better ATC services? Yet,
we cannot rely on the assumption that the money, which a limit might
save an impoverished State, would be spent on improving ATC services.
There would of course be no way for that State to calculate the difference,
and there would be other pressing claims in its budget. On the contrary,
we can employ the primitive argument of deterrence: if a State knows
that its liability is unlimited, it may be induced to lessen the chance of
negligence by improving its ATC facilities.
A more powerful argument for a limit on liability is that it avoids
litigation by facilitating quick settlements. It is a definite economic benefit
if compensation is paid quickly after the damage has been done. "Reduc-
tion of litigation by offering an easy basis for settlement" is one justifica-
tion for creating a limit,"' but it is at the same time an admission that our
court system is inadequate, that claims in courts will not be adjudged
within a reasonable amount of time (which in many cases is true), and
that a settlement outside of court for an established limit is more just
(which is many times untrue).
The refutation to this is, that in a proof of fault system, the ATC
agency would be so protected that it would undoubtedly insist on taking
the claim into court. This contrasts with the carriers or operators under
the Rome and Warsaw Conventions, who are absolutely or presumed
40 On 15 Nov. 1965, the State Department gave notice of the denunciation by the United
States of the Warsaw Convention to become effective on 15 May 1966. See Kreindler, The De-
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291 (1965). The text of the de-
nunciation is reprinted id. at 303.
41 Sand, Limitation of Liability and Passengers' Accident Compensation under the Warsaw Con-
vention, 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 260, 277 (1962). Professor Sand's article greatly influenced the
Administration's bill on compulsory insurance.
4' LATC No. 19, at 16.
4' DRION, op. cit. supra note 23, at 42.
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liable, in a way that favors the claimant, so that a settlement out of court
actually saves both parties money.
If we accept that reasoning, then we can say that merely because parties
in Warsaw cases tend to accept the established limit, i.e., that the carrier
almost automatically pays the full limit to the claimant outside of court,
a precedent is not thus established for ATC liability. Presumed liability
and proof of fault are so different that the ATC agency almost certainly
would not pay the full limit unless ordered to do so by a court.
Would a limitation on ATC liability dissuade States from imposing
charges for the use of air traffic services?" Approximately twenty-five
States are reported by ICAO to charge such fees.45 It seems to this writer
that a limitation would indeed be some deterrence to fees, but that since
these charges are not yet clearly legal and the problem involves a minority
of States, it would not in itself be a justification for a limitation. Drion
writes that "the better position of the passenger in insuring the risk of
his death or injury in excess of the average passenger accident risk" is a
justification for a limitation of liability in the Warsaw Convention."6
In regard to ATC liability then, if a limit is fixed, the operator, passenger,
shipper, or third person on the surface knows the limit on potential liabil-
ity, and can take out insurance in excess thereof as is needed. However,
aiding the passenger with his arithmetic and helping him compute his own
value is not a strong reason for establishing a limit.
Limitation of its liability is not needed for the ATC agency to obtain
insurance. The governments will in most cases be self-insurers; that is,
they will carry the cost themselves, because the operation is so large and
widespread that self-insurance is cheaper. Only for the private ATC
operator will insurance come into question, but it is noteworthy that none
of the governments answering to the ICAO questionnaire on their regula-
tion of ATC mentioned that they required insurance by private ATC
operators.4 The United States, in its answer, reported seventeen non-
governmental ATC towers, but these few private ATC operators will
usually not serve international flights which must go to those large airports
having proper customs and immigration facilities.
The old quid pro quo argument for a limitation, i.e., limitation of lia-
bility as a counterpart of an aggravated system of liability, is the most
often heard justification. The argument is a vicious circle with little mean-
ing, says Drion." The individual claimant in fact suffers, because recovery
of all the claimants has been limited as illustrated by claimants' frequent
attempts to get around the liability limitation in the Warsaw Convention
44LATC No. 19, at 17.
4' The United States is now working on a payment system for the use of air traffic services.
In 1963, the President said that the United States must develop a system of user charges which
would apply to international carriers. KENNEDY, STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
POLICY 13 (24 April 1963). Consequently the United States Bureau of the Budget is doing a
study of user charges. See 5 FAA ANN. REP. 92 (1963).
46 DRION, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 42.
" ICAO Questionnaire; DRION, oP. cit. supra note 23, at 21. Drion rejects the argument that
limitation of liability is needed for ability to insure aviation risks. Only for delays and transporta-
tion of goods does he accept this argument.
48 DRION, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 29-30. He excepts liability for carriage of goods.
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by alleging willful misconduct. There is no collective user interest in the
exchanged limited liability for presumed or absolute liability.
Air traffic control cannot be considered a catastrophe-risk; "9 one cannot
suppose that accidents will be the rule through its use. Even if one were
to accept this argument, the refutation is that the risk, borne by govern-
ments, is neatly distributed to the taxpayers. It is not sustained by small
operators struggling for their existence.
C. Uniformity Of Law Considerations
One cannot favor a limitation on liability for the sake of "uniformity"
without having something specific in mind. One must inquire as to what
the ATC liability convention should be uniform with-national legislation
or other private air law conventions?
In national legislation, one can often see two different regimes existing
concurrently, one inside and one outside of a convention. For example,
there is a deep distinction between Warsaw and non-Warsaw carriage.
If a passenger flies on a domestic flight in the United States, he is not
subject to the limited liability of the Warsaw Convention; but when he
flies on an international flight, although the damage takes place while he
is still inside the United States, he is subject to these limits. The United
Kingdom, in fact, decided to apply these limits to domestic carriage, so
some authorities obviously believe that there is a need for uniformity.
Next, we discuss the question of whether there should be uniformity
with other private air law conventions. At the 1960 Session of the ICAO
Legal Committee, Sir Richard Wilberforce said that he could not justify
a limitation of the operator's liability vis-a-vis passengers, when the pas-
senger was not subject to a limitation of his claim against the ATC."
In other words, he thought that ATC liability should be limited in order
to conform with the principle of limited liability of other private air law
conventions.
The reaction to these arguments can only be to question again the
abstract unit "uniformity." Is it desirable that all private air law con-
ventions have a limitation (any limitation?) on damages? Should those
limits themselves be uniform?
Naturally, the reply is that any limit will not do; it must be a specific
one, agreeable to many States. If we have disposed of the necessity of a
limitation for economic reasons, then we can scarcely believe that a limita-
tion is justified as an abstract ideal. It must be meant that the limits them-
selves should be uniform, so that the courts, the shippers, the carriers-
everyone-will know that the amount of probable recompense is, e.g.,
$8,300, whether the airline or the ATC agency is being sued or whether
third persons on the ground are involved. Of course the argument must
break down here, because there is no existing uniformity of limits in
private air law conventions, except for such minor points as baggage and
4Id. at 17-18.
5'0 ICAO Doc. 8137-LC/147-1, at 174 (1960).
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cargo in the Warsaw and Draft Aerial Collisions Conventions. There is
no single norm with which to conform.
Let it be supposed that all the existing air law and draft conventions
were amended to allow one uniform amount of compensation. That would
simply put a certain monetary value on human life to which no one indi-
vidual would agree-a clear compromise value. The conventions would
say, in effect, no matter whom you have lost, no matter where or how
within the realm of air transportation, the value of that loss is $8,300.
Finally, it can be argued that the subjects of the conventions are similar
only superficially: the air carrier or operator provides transportation for
a profit; the ATC agency aids transportation for the public welfare. To
establish a similarity at this point, when so few exist at any other point,
is artificial.
D. Sovereign Immunity And Security Considerations
States which have not yet waived sovereign immunity might be induced
to accept limited liability under the ATC convention." This argument
appeared both at the first and the second sessions of the ATC Subcom-
mittee. Some States are so anxious to have an ATC convention that they
are willing to compromise and to accept a limitation on liability in order
to make it more attractive for States which do not now permit themselves
to be held liable to join the ATC convention." However, it seems doubtful
that the few remaining States which practice sovereign immunity would
be induced to change if they were offered limited liability for their ATC,
because the reasons by which those States justify their immunity are sup-
posedly not economic. Those reasons are, instead, that the king is infallible,
or that it is illogical to make the source of laws liable.
One writer suggests that States should not permit their air power to be
sapped by unlimited payment of claims, because the combined air power
has important military value." A way of solving this problem is to in-
clude a clause in the ATC convention similar to the Chicago Convention's
Article 89 exempting the contracting States from the obligations of the
convention in case of war or national emergency.
E. Conclusions
A questionnaire asking Member States whether they, in their domestic
laws, imposed limits on the liability of their ATC brought back the
answers that none of the twenty-eight reporting States limited ATC
liability." Only the United States reported limited liability under the
wrongful death statutes of some states. Neither do the international ATC
organizations, Eurocontrol, ASECNA, or COCESNA limit their liability.
In spite of the answers to the questionnaire, the majority of the ATC
5"LATC No. 19, at 17.
"Second Meeting of the ICAO Legal Committee's Subcommittee, Liability of Air Traffic Con-
trol Agencies, ICAO LC/SC/LATC No. 32, at 8 (1965).
"Hadjis, Liability Limitations in the Carriage of Passengers and Goods by Air and Sea 111
(1958) (unpublished thesis in McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law Library).
' ICAO Questionnaire.
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Subcommittee agreed that there should be a limitation of liability in the
ATC convention, 5 some upon the slim basis that they were willing to
compromise in this respect in order to make the convention more attractive
to others. Although compromises may indeed be necessary to make con-
ventions work, it is not clear why that middle group did not swing in
the other direction. In general, it is odd that the international policies of
a majority of States would be such a contrast to their national practices
and policies.
This writer submits that since the ATC agencies are offered such court
protection under a proof of fault system, the scales should not be further
weighted against claimants, thus making the chance for just recovery so
small that it is not worth the claimant's time to pursue it. However, since
the ICAO Subcommittee's decision has so far been to establish limits, it is
only fair that this discussion include an investigation of what the limits
should be, if established.
VI. CHOICE OF LIMITS ON LIABILITY
If it is decided that liability should be limited, one must ask more
questions. Would any of the limits in existing private air law conventions
and draft conventions be applicable or must new limits be established?
Should recourse actions of air carriers and operators against the ATC
agency be limited? Which laws would govern the recourse actions of ATC
agencies against the air carriers or operators?
In all of these questions one danger is apparent: circumvention. The
claimant will always attempt to place his suit under the convention which
yields him the most certain return, unless his chances of recovering the
higher award are very good. If ATC liability is limited, he will almost
always turn to the Warsaw and Rome Conventions. If ATC liability is
unlimited, and the claimant's chances of proving the agency at fault are
better than fifty per cent, the claimant may risk the proof of fault pro-
cedure in the hope of a higher award. If his suit succeeds, the chances are
that he has produced such conclusive evidence of the ATC agency's fault
that a recourse action by the ATC agency against the private carrier or
operator would not be successful. On the other hand, the air carriers'
suits against the ATC agency would not involve unreasonable amounts,
because they could not hope to recover more than the damage costs origi-
nally paid by them to their claimants.
It seems to this writer that passengers, shippers, and third persons on
the surface are better served by unlimited ATC liability; their presence
in court may thus be worthwhile. The carriers are better protected because
unlimited ATC liability will draw some suits away from them, and the
ATC agency is well protected because unlimited ATC liability will draw
some suits away from them. The ATC agency is also well protected in
its proof of fault system, where the air carrier has no better chance of
proving the ATC agency at fault in a recourse action than the direct
claimant would have had.
55 LATC No. 32, supra note 52, at 10.
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This position leads into the issue of causal relationship. No matter
where a claimant places his suit, he must show that the defendant caused
the damage to happen. The claimant thus assesses his chances of proving
causal relationship. If he has a twenty-five per cent chance of showing
that the air carrier caused the damage, he will sue the air carrier, even
though the ATC convention has unlimited liability. The air carrier in a
recourse action has only that same twenty-five per cent chance to show
that the ATC agency caused the damage. It is not until the claimant's
chances of showing causal relationship are better than fifty per cent that
one can suppose he will take the risk of a proof of fault system.
A. Direct Actions Against The ATC Agency
There are three ways to determine which limits might apply to an ATC
convention. In the first place, one can adopt the limits of existing private
air law conventions, which have been laboriously agreed upon. Second,
one can modify those limits with schemes which might interest wealthier
States. Third, one can establish new limits.
The advantage of using the old limits" is that they have the backing of
the majority, though not necessarily the most important aviation States.
Significantly, one member of the ATC Subcommittee wanted limits to be
four times higher than the present limits in The Hague Protocol which he
considered inadequate.57 The Hague Protocol is the most updated version,
but since its limits are partially found in the Draft Convention on Aerial
Collisions, one could say that the Draft Convention's limits would apply
to: persons killed, injured, or delayed (also found in The Hague Protocol);
objects carried by a person (also in The Hague Protocol) ; baggage, cargo,
and mail delayed, damaged or lost (also in The Hague Protocol); damage
to or loss of use of aircraft. The Rome Convention would apply to sur-
face damage. 8
Another way of utilizing the existing limits is simply to say that the
limits of any other air law convention which pertain to the situation, and
to which the ATC convention also applied, would be in effect." For
example, if surface damage were involved, and if the State were a mem-
ber of both the Rome and ATC Conventions, then the Rome limits would
apply. The defects of this solution are obvious. Depending on which
membership a State held, the foreign claimant might or might not be
subject to a limit. There would be no certainty. The major defect of
applying existing limits under any guise is, of course, that they are too
low to be acceptable to certain influential States, notably the United States.
Entirely new limits"° would, of course, cause much dissension and would
involve new surveys. Three conditions, however, might warrant a study
56 LATC No. 19, at 17.
5 LATC No. 32, supra note 52, at 13.
If the Rome Convention's limits were adopted for ATC-caused surface damage, an apportion-
ment of compensation for surface damage would be included because of the Rome Convention's
ceiling on total damages in Art. 14.
5 LATC No. 19, at 17.
60 Ibid.
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of such changes: if the world's economic situation, or a substantial part
of it, had altered since the last limits were adopted; or if the ATC agency,
being government owned, could not be compared to private air carriers;
or if the limits should be different because the ATC convention was adopt-
ing a proof of fault system.
In the first case, no move was made to change the limits of the Draft
Convention on Aerial Collisions when they were discussed as recently as
1964.61 So, although one might argue that the standard of living in most
of the important aviation States has improved since 19 5 5 when The Hague
Protocol's limits were established, the argument must continue that the
dissatisfaction with the present limits is not world-wide. It is the attitude
of a powerful minority. The majority of the Legal Committee did not
find revision of limits justified based on change in the world's economy.
The second argument, that since ATC is government owned it can
better afford high limits than can air carriers or operators, may be true.
The government theoretically has the resources of every taxpayer in the
country, whereas the air carrier or operator will be much more limited.
However, it can be argued that if the carrier cannot pay for its negligent
acts, its existence is against the public welfare.
The third and best argument is that air carriers and operators are either
presumed liable or are absolutely liable under the existing air law conven-
tion, whereas the ATC agency protected by the proof of fault system will
not be liable as often as the operators or carriers will, and the ATC agency
will better be able to pay higher awards on the few successful suits. Ideally,
of course, the sole test of compensation should be the damages suffered,
not the defendant's ability to pay.
Finally it must be concluded that any limit adopted would cause some
States to abstain from ratifying the ATC convention. It is perhaps a
matter of weighing whether the convention should be attractive to a
majority of States, however small their aviation interests may be, or to a
minority of States (especially the United States) which form the hub of
the world's aviation activities.
B. Recourse Actions Against The ATC Agency
If direct actions are limited in the convention on ATC liability, the
drafters have a choice of limiting recourse actions. Unlimited recourse
actions could cause the ATC agency to suffer. 2 For instance, imagine that
a foreign non-Warsaw air carrier crashes in France. A passenger sues the
air carrier and recovers; no limits are applicable to the award. The air
carrier, believing that it can prove ATC negligence, sues Eurocontrol,
which we imagine to be a party to the ATC liability convention, and the
carrier wins and recovers full compensation. It is the ATC agency which
must bear the difference between what it would have paid the passenger
in a direct action subject to limits, and what it finally had to pay in a
recourse action not subject to limits.
61 ICAO Doc. 8444 LC/1 51, supra note 25, at 17.
62 LATC No. 19, at 19.
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Therefore, it is most reasonable that recourse actions should also be
subjoct to limits. Does any hardship result? Yes, but not to the ATC
agency. The situation is just reversed, i.e., the passengers may sue the non-
Warsaw carrier and recover without regard to limits on recovery. Then
the air carrier in a recourse action against the ATC agency cannot recover
the full amount, but is subject to limits. Thus, the non-Warsaw carrier
must bear a loss for damage caused by negligence of the ATC agency.
This situation would be infrequent as long as most States are parties to
the Warsaw Convention. If the ATC convention's limits were lower than
those of other private air law conventions, the air carriers might suffer in
a recourse action, but the possibility of such low limits being established
is most unlikely. Thus we can say that if limits were created for direct
actions, it would be just to put similar limits on recourse actions.
C. Recourse Actions By The ATC Agency Against
The Air Carrier Or Operator
A reverse situation exists when the liability of the air carrier or operator
is limited under another air law convention, but the ATC convention has
higher limits or no limits at all. " One argument is that it is to the ad-
vantage of the claimant (passenger, shipper, or third person on the sur-
face) to avoid the limits of the other convention by bringing the action
against the ATC agency. The ATC agency would then bring a recourse
action against the air carrier or operator, thus suffering by being subject
to lower limits. The ATC agency would have to bear the difference be-
tween what it paid the claimant and what it could recover from the air-
line." If a limitation on liability in the ATC convention were the same
as that on the liability of the air carrier or operator, then one could not
construct such a problem.
Another solution would be to apply the air carrier's or operator's limita-
tion to potential recourse actions only, in order to avoid the circumven-
tion; or, to carry the argument further, open the ATC convention only
to recourse actions. Of course, this is highly impractical, for then few
suits against the ATC agency would ever be brought to court under
the ATC convention. For instance, if the ATC agency were clearly at
fault, a claimant could not base his suit against the air carrier, and he
would not be able to present a direct claim under the ATC convention.
If proof of fault, combined with no limitation on liability, were the
system adopted for the ATC convention, however, the number of re-
course actions would be substantially reduced. The proof of fault shows its
strength here. It throws up a barrier against claims which are potential re-
course actions, because it encourages passengers, shippers, and third persons
on the surface to recover with less difficulty using the presumed liability of
63 Ibid.
64 Compare Warsaw Convention, Art. 24, which states that "any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention"; and
Rome Convention, Art. 9; and Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, Art. 8, stating that the
operator shall not be liable in a recourse action which would result in his liability exceeding the
limitation of the convention.
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the Warsaw Convention and the absolute liability of the Rome Conven-
tion. Otherwise, the claimant would have to prove the fault of the ATC
agency, and that is not simple. However, if the claimant succeeds in his
suit against the ATC agency, it is unlikely that the agency would have
sufficient cause for recourse action. Combined with unlimited liability, a
proof of fault system avoids conflicts with the limited liability of other
conventions by cancelling a claimant's temptation to recover indirectly.
It discourages circumvention; it encourages claims to be settled in one
action.
A solution to the problem of recourse actions is one prepared by the
United States for the Fourteenth Session (1964) of the ICAO Legal
Committee: a consolidation of private air law conventions. In a consoli-
dated air law convention, almost all claims would be in the form of direct
actions.
In regard to recourse actions under such a convention we would be inter-
ested in the exploration and possible development of a system without a
limitation, in which recoveries would be based on proof of fault, and damages
apportioned in relation to the degree of fault of the various tort-feasors 5
It should be noted, however, that the United States omitted the Warsaw
Convention from its consolidation proposal. To diminish recourse actions
by consolidation, it is imperative that the Warsaw Convention be included,
since its limitation on liability would usually be related to recourse actions.
The great number of claims brought under the Warsaw Convention shows
that it is the relationship between the air carrier and the passenger and
shipper which is most likely to be tested in concurrence with surface dam-
age, aerial collisions, and ATC-caused damage.
When the subject of limits is introduced, one point leads to another.
Each argument is composed of so many variables that it is difficult to
build one idea upon another. The structure may collapse if one brick is
removed, one factor changed. Therefore, several problems have not been
touched. For instance, having made the decision to establish limits, the
Subcommittee must deal with their correlation. Should a claimant be able
to recover a total of more than the carrier's applicable limits," i.e., should
he be subject to a cumulative system of limits? Imagine, for instance, that
two different ATC agencies are at fault for a collision in which the claim-
ant lost his wife. Can he sue and recover twice, that is, double the limit
for that one loss?" A no-limit system of liability, of course, does not have
this stumbling block. This article has discussed only the most significant
issues in order to illustrate the nature of the problems which arise with
each new argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
The technological trend in ATC is a recognizable, steady improvement,
6' ICAO LC/Working Draft No. 710, at 4 (1964).
66 LATC No. 32, supra note 52, at 11-13.
67 Compare Rome Convention, Art. 14.
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but the direction of legal protection is not yet clear. It is the purpose
of this article to outline a desirable trend. The writer recommends control
through the proposed convention on ATC liability, with many ATC-
related services included in the definition. There are no compelling reasons
for a method of liability other than proof of fault, which has already
demonstrated its strengths. Within the context of air traffic control, a
limitation on liability is rejected as being incompatible with a proof of
fault system.
